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     Abstract
This paper reports tests of hypotheses that a variety of interest rates and other
measures from financial markets in countries belonging to the European Monetary Union
(EMU) were converging prior to the introduction of the euro in January 1999. We
expected to find convergence because of i) removal of national barriers to flows of funds,
ii) explicit and market-driven harmonization of regulation and supervisory standards, iii)
coordinated macroeconomic policies, iv) privatization of state enterprises, and v) fiscal
redistribution of resources. The first series of tests (σ-tests) are that standard deviations
and/or coefficients of variation of cross-sections of national measures are diminishing
over time, relative to a group of non-EMU countries. Evidence of convergence was found
for inflation rates, short- and long-term nominal interest rates, and ex post real short-term
rates, but not for real per capita GDP. The second series concerned levels and trends in
interbank claims and noninterest income at banks. These measures are believed to be
larger and growing more rapidly when banks are attempting to escape binding national
regulations.  Interbank claims were larger at EMU banks than at banks in other countries,
but had no interpretable trends. The ratios of noninterest income to total bank income and
assets were found to have positive trends. The third series of tests used a statistical cost
accounting model estimated for nine countries to examine whether marginal costs of
liabilities and revenues from assets were tending toward equality, as might be expected in
an efficient unified economy. Within the EMU, significant differences across six major
countries were observed for 1994, 1995, and 1996, but not in 1997 or 1998. Convergence
seemed to be being achieved.1
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I   INTRODUCTION
The European Community (EC), established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, was
the forerunner of the movement toward European economic union; its latest
manifestation is the European Monetary Union (EMU), which in 1999 adopted a set of
fixed exchange rates among eleven European countries and defined a common currency,
the euro. The European Union (EU) began issuing directives in 1977 that were designed
to promote open borders and implement reforms and pave the way for integrated banking
under the then new European Monetary System (EMS).
The European Central Bank was established to conduct monetary policy and
manage the exchange rate between the euro and other nonmember national currencies. A
policy of mutual recognition was adopted by the European Union to allow member
countries to retain some autonomy when regulating banks that were chartered within their
borders. However, with a few qualifications, a bank that is chartered in one country is
permitted to establish branches in other member countries and to provide services that it
is allowed to offer in its home country, throughout the EU. Further, individuals and firms
in one country can transact with banks in another country using contracts based on the
latter country￿s laws. As a result, banking markets in all member countries can expect
changes and eventual convergence to a common economic regulatory environment.
The present paper reports tests of hypotheses about the extent to which
convergence is evident in national financial data. Although economic union permits all
factors of production to flow across borders, funds flow across borders with much greater
ease than people, commodities, or machines. The next section provides some background
information about trends in bank portfolios, interest rates, income, and growth among
countries in the European Union and selected other countries. Formal tests of
convergence are postponed until sections three and five. Section two also considers how
residual regulatory heterogeneity and technical change in finance are likely to qualify
patterns of convergence across countries. We recognize but do not investigate the
possibility of convergence at the sub-national level. The third section proposes a set of
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models for measuring convergence and testing for its presence. The fourth section
describes data resources that are used to test hypotheses. The fifth presents results of
statistical tests and the sixth summarizes findings.
II   CHANGE   AND   CONVERGENCE
The process of achieving an economic union is both time and resource absorbing.
The motives and goals of the promoters of the ongoing effort to achieve European union
are beyond the scope of the present paper. However, conventional arguments suggest that
there are likely to be large efficiency gains from removing artificial barriers to trade and
movements of factors, once a new equilibrium is achieved.  In this sense European
integration can be viewed as an investment that is expected to yield a positive rate of
return.
a. On the concept of convergence. Convergence can be measured in several ways.
Because we do not know the long-term equilibrium values of economic measures, we
cannot report the extent to which European countries have achieved equilibrium.
Nonetheless, it is enlightening to examine the trajectories of selected measures in
different countries to see whether they are approaching common values. There is an
extensive literature (See Durlauf, Steven N. and Danny T. Quah, 1999 for references)
about whether growth trajectories converge to unique or multiple equilibria.
Removing barriers to exchange is not the same as attempting to achieve an
optimal growth path and configuration of resources, but there are similarities. For
example, one expects to observe homogeneous labor units moving from areas with low
wages and opportunities to more promising areas. If such movements are effected, one
should observe a movement toward a more equal distribution of per capita income across
countries. Similarly, funds should flow to areas that yield higher rates of return. As funds
flow away from areas where yields are low, real rates of return across countries should
tend to equalize, a well-known characteristic of an efficient market. Full equalization is
unlikely to obtain because labor is heterogeneous and because residual regulatory
differences persist in different countries.
A different type of convergence has been mandated by the agreements, such as
the Maastricht Treaty, that eventually led to the appearance of the euro in 1999. In
particular, in order to qualify for membership in the EMU, governments pledged to limit
the magnitude of their deficits to a small percentage of GDP. Central banks adopted
policies to achieve a desired range of inflation rates. Countries with high ratios of
government debt to GDP have been obliged to reduce them to an agreed level. Because
new sovereign debt issues are effectively being made in euros, the possibility of
devaluation by individual countries has vanished, which further reduces differences in
interest rates across countries.
Even earlier, the European Union had been transferring funds from affluent
regions to regions of Europe that are impoverished. It also required that government
owned or controlled enterprises like banks be privatized and that they no longer receive
subsidies and other forms of protection from the rigors of competition. While transfers3
and privatizations will not eliminate all inequalities, these actions are likely to foster
partial convergence of variables across countries.
b. Is there evidence of convergence? In this subsection we report evidence about
convergence in several important economic variables for selected countries over the past
few decades. As will be seen data are not easy to interpret and in important respects they
are fragmentary. It is, nevertheless, important to recognize that governments and their
central banks were pursuing policies designed to achieve a common trajectory long
before the Maastricht Treaty went into effect in late 1993.
First, consider trends in per capita GDP between 1960 and 1997, expressed in
1990 US dollars.
1 In Figure 1 six countries have very similar trajectories, Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands; apart from Austria, they are five
of the original six EC countries. The other EC country, Luxembourg, had a very similar
trajectory until about 1984, when it began to grow at a faster rate as it transformed itself
into a financial center. By 1997 it had the highest per capita income in Europe. Ireland
seems to have been following the same financial center specialization as Luxembourg,
and again has been growing at a faster rate since 1984. Finland has a higher and Portugal
and Spain a lower trajectory, but all are growing at about the same rate as the six
countries in the cluster. The similar paths of the five original EC countries over the past
40 years suggest that increasing integration has not led to growing arithmetic disparities
and, indeed, has resulted in convergence because there are smaller percentage differences
in per capita income among these countries.
Figure 2 plots a simple arithmetic average of the EMU countries with comparable
series for Denmark, Greece, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US. The average
of eleven countries is growing at about the same rate as the US and Denmark, faster than
Greece, Sweden, and the UK, and slower than Japan and Norway. At the end of 1997, the
ranking of highest per capita income countries is Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark,
Finland, Sweden, Japan, and the US.
International comparisons are always subtle. If one uses the Penn World Tables,
which are unreported in this paper and end in 1992, a different ranking of the six highest
per capita income countries obtains for 1992 ￿ the US, Luxembourg, Norway, Japan,
Germany, Sweden, and France. Apart from the US, which was growing at about the same
rate along a higher path than the rest, and Japan and Luxembourg, which rose strongly
between 1960 and 1992 and between 1984 and 1992 respectively, the EC countries were
again tightly bunched, with no appreciable changes in arithmetic differences over time.
The plot for Germany does decline slightly after 1990 when the country was reunified.
The UK was growing slower than the EC countries. Until 1992, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain had lower incomes and were growing at a slower rate than other
countries.
Table 1 reports information about inflation rates. To conserve space and avoid a
discontinuity associated with German reunification, annual inflation rates are shown for
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the countries in every other year. Again there is clear evidence of convergence and a
general downtrend in inflation rates. Because of an aversion to the destabilizing effects of
deflation by most central banks, it is difficult to distinguish between convergence owing
to European integration and convergence owing to falling average inflation rates. An
attempt to make this distinction is reported in Section V.
Nominal money market interest rates for countries in the EMU, plotted in Figure
3, display a strong pattern of convergence between 1978 and 1999. Because of falling
inflation, it is again difficult to identify the extent to which this convergence is a
consequence of European integration. Figure 4 reports a plot of ex post real money
market interest rates, which afford a better perspective on the effects of integration on
convergence. Portugal is distinctive because it had large negative real rates until 1987.
Apart from Portugal, real rates in the EMU were relatively volatile from 1979,
approximately when the EMS was established and the European Currency Unit (ecu) was
introduced, until 1992, when a series of successful speculative attacks on national
currencies occurred. The attacks forced the British pound, the Italian lira, and the Danish
krone to be devalued relative to the ecu, and eventually would lead to the introduction of
the euro. Since 1992 real interest rates have been quite similar across EMU countries,
although both Austria in 1995 and Ireland at the end of the period had negative real rates.
Real interest rates have been trending down since the events of 1992; we analyze their
convergence in Section V.
Nominal government bond yields in the EMU have definitely converged, in large
part because risks of devaluation of national currencies have disappeared. This is evident
in Figure 5 where there is also clear evidence of a decline in nominal borrowing costs for
all countries. Belgium, Italy, and Spain have especially benefited from a decrease in
borrowing costs. In part, the decline is a vote of confidence about the viability of the
EMU and the European Central Bank￿s commitment to low inflation, even if the euro￿s
value is falling relative to other major currencies.
c. Technical difficulties in assessing convergence. Complicating analysis of the
effects of introducing the EMU is the ongoing technological revolution in finance.
Drawing on information provided by the Bank for International Settlements, Table 2
indicates that large changes were occurring in the ways individuals executed transactions
in all countries and that they were occurring at different rates in different countries. The
numbers of automated teller machines and point of sale terminals and their utilization
were generally rising and the numbers of checks written were falling. As banks and the
payments system become automated, fewer banks and branches may be required and the
character of their services will change.
Table 3 is constructed from OECD statistics on aggregate portfolios and earnings
of banks in the EMU and selected other countries. When data are available a summary of
bank portfolios, earnings, and number of banks are shown on four dates, 1985, 1989,
1993, and 1997 for each country. Bank portfolios are expressed as a percentage of total
assets. There are enormous differences in portfolios across countries, in part due to
differences in the numbers and types of banks being aggregated by the OECD.
2
                                                          
2 The fraction of a country￿s banks that underlie the reported portfolios in Table 3 inexplicably varies
considerably across countries and over time for a given country. For example, in the case of Italy, the5
Differences also result because the percentage of interbank deposits in total assets varies
considerably across countries. When interbank deposits are a large fraction of total assets
in a country, the sum of loans, securities, and other assets as a percentage of total assets is
tautologically smaller. We have examined but do not report bank portfolios as a
percentage of total assets less interbank deposits and record that differences in the
fraction of loans in total assets are smaller with this correction, but are still substantial.
Reported aggregate interbank claims on the asset and deposits on the liability sides of
balance sheets are positively correlated, but not equal in any country. Except for banks in
Greece, Portugal, and Spain, cash and balances with a central bank are smaller than five
percent of total assets in all countries. After netting out interbank deposits, loans as a
fraction of net assets are lowest in Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Similarly, after
netting out interbank deposits, deposits as a fraction of net assets are lowest in Belgium,
France, and Italy. Clearly, the nature of intermediation varies across EMU countries,
before the emergence of the euro.
The average rate of return on assets in the penultimate column of Table 3 has also
been extraordinarily volatile over the reported years, given the large samples of banks
being considered. The three largest EMU countries, France, Germany, and Italy, have
pronounced negative trends, as do Austria and Japan. This pattern may be a consequence
of growing international competition in banking. Banks in Denmark, Ireland, and the US
have the highest and banks in Belgium, Finland, France, and Japan have the lowest
average rates of return in our OECD database.
Table 4 reports information assembled by the European Central Bank about trends
in the numbers of banks, branches, and automatic teller machines (ATMs) in the
European Union, between 1980 and 1997. Trends in the number of banks reported in the
top section of the table are strongly negative in most EU countries, but are positive in the
least affluent countries, Portugal and Greece. They are also positive in Luxembourg and
Ireland, which seem to be becoming international financial centers. In the middle section
of the table the number of branches per thousand inhabitants is reported. Positive trends
are evident in the cases of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; with the exception
of Spain, all had low ratios of branches to population in 1985.  Negative trends are
apparent in the cases of Finland, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands, which had
relatively high ratios in 1985. Convergence in branch structures may be occurring. The
bottom section shows a universally positive trend in ATMs per capita, which is plausible
with the introduction of new technology.
Figure 6 reports information that has been assembled by the OECD about trends
in income at banks. The ratios of non-interest income to gross operating income and to
total assets have been trending higher since about 1980. The increase in the gross
operating income ratio is understandable because of the general decrease in inflation and
nominal interest rates. The OECD includes realized capital gains in its definition of non-
interest income. The increase in the total assets ratio reflects ongoing changes in bank
                                                                                                                                                                            
number of banks in the OECD database fell from 422 in 1985 to 255 in 1997 while the population of Italian
banks was 1,192 in 1985 and 935 in 1997. In some other countries all existing banks are in the database.
These changes in the number of reporting banks seem to have had large effects on portfolio shares, making
intertemporal comparisons of portfolio shares unreliable in several countries, especially so in the cases of
Denmark, Italy, and Japan.6
practices that are partly a response to changes in technology. They are analyzed further in
Section V. The following quotations illustrate the complexity of analyzing unification:
￿It is anticipated that differences in structure between the EU financial systems
will continue to prevail in the medium term for a variety of reasons (structural as
well as cyclical). In this respect, diverse fiscal treatments at a national level could
favour or divert financial intermediation. In Finland, for instance, the tax system
favours bank intermediation, since most of the bank accounts held by individuals
are tax exempt. Conversely, different tax treatments (e.g. in Belgium where
capital gains are tax exempt) have stimulated a significant growth in undertakings
engaging in collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and
investment funds.￿ [European Central Bank, 2000, pp. 8-9]
￿Banks responses to the changing financial systems have been most clearly
visible in their financial accounts. They are first reflected in their off-balance-
sheet activities.  .  .  . Major off-balance-sheet items are related to traditional types
of business (loan commitments, guarantees, etc.) and derivative activities. Off-
balance-sheet activities have been growing at remarkably high rates in many EU
countries. The derivatives business also has a quite different degree of relative
importance across the EU countries.  .  .  .  The other noticeable change in banks￿
financial accounts concerns the development of non-interest income. The
competition from non-bank financial institutions and the resulting pressure on
intermediation margins has led banks to offset the decrease in their interest
income by shifting to other sources of income such as fees and commissions.￿
[European Central Bank, 2000, p. 10]
Finally, there is anecdotal evidence of persistent regulatory heterogeneity among
the countries in the EMU. Banks operating in different regulatory environments can be
expected to respond to European unification in different ways. While an exhaustive
comparison of regulations is beyond the scope of the present paper, the following
statements by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, a member of the Executive Board of the
European Central Bank, convey the problem well:
￿Can it be said that with the introduction of the euro, there will no longer be
segmentation in the financial market? Here too, the answer is negative.  .  .  . For
instance, the rules and practices governing the working of the labour market are a
very significant obstacle to further consolidation and restructuring of the banking
sector, and may contribute to maintaining some degree of segmentation.  .   .   .
Proximity to customers is a crucial element in the service industry.  .   .   .
Segmentation might also be induced by other remaining differences between
national regulation and legislation in Member States. This holds true not only for
supervisory matters, but also, for instance, for bankruptcy legislation or for
company law, since both have a substantial influence on lending decisions.￿
[Padoa-Schioppa, 2000a]7
￿An additional complication is that the national central banks are very often
entrusted with the responsibility of supervising banks, but as supervisors they are
a national authority. I have worked for a national authority for 30 years now, and I
know that these bodies are expected to look after their own national interests.
National interests very often involve promoting the strength and competitiveness
of the national banking system, or of the national financial centre.  .  .  .
Moreover, co-operation between national authorities needs to be stepped up in
order to ensure effective banking supervision.￿  [Padoa-Schioppa, 2000b]
III    MODELS   FOR   MEASURING   AND   TESTING   FOR   CONVERGENCE
In Section V of this paper three classes of formal tests of hypotheses about
convergence are reported. They are respectively a) tests that time series in the foregoing
charts are converging, b) tests that bank portfolios and their resulting income flows are
changing, and c) tests that the ratios of bank net income to total assets and shadow rates
of return on assets and liabilities in bank portfolios in different countries are converging.
For reasons that are evident in the preceding quotations, none of these tests is
straightforward. The present section develops justifications for these tests.
a) Testing for convergence of time series. Much of the recent discussion of
convergence has emerged from the economic growth literature, which has been well
summarized in a recent paper by Durlauf and Quah [1999]. They describe and critique
two measures, β and σ. Unconditional β convergence can crudely be paraphrased to
imply that deviations from some known equilibrium value or path decrease at a constant
geometric rate. It is not well defined when an equilibrium value is unknown and there is
little theoretical guidance about what the rate of convergence should be. Further, as
Milton Friedman [1992] has recently reminded us, informal graphical arguments about β
convergence based on the notion that rates of growth are negatively related to initial
levels of, say, per capita GDP are examples of a potentially serious ￿regression fallacy￿.
Friedman proposes as a check against inappropriate inferences that terminal per capita
GDP be related to rates of growth of per capita GDP. If the result does not indicate a
positive relation, convergence may be inferred, even if the estimate of the rate of
convergence is not identified.
An alternative recommended by Friedman is that one should examine whether the
standard deviations of a set of cross-sectional measures of series that are believed to be
converging diminish over time. This corresponds to the aforementioned σ measure,
which as Durlauf and Quah explain is also underidentified [pp. 274- 6 and, especially, pp.
285 - 7]. Thus, without a firm theoretical foundation attempts to measure convergence are
unavoidably hazardous, a conclusion with which we reluctantly concur. Nevertheless,
below we test for convergence by examining whether a series of cross-section standard
deviations have a negative trend.
There are strong arguments for believing that some series are heteroskedastic,
quite independently of whether convergence is occurring. For example, nominal interest
rates cannot be negative in most economies. As nominal interest rates fall toward zero,
there is a strong presumption that the standard deviation of a series of interest rates will8
also fall. Such a mechanical phenomenon should not be interpreted as convergence. A
correction is necessary in order to perform tests that convergence is occurring. Somewhat
arbitrarily, in empirical work we often perform tests on coefficients of variation ￿ the
standard deviation of a series divided by its mean. Because we believe that growth paths
of real per capita income also have error terms that are heteroskedastic, in Section V we
study coefficients of variation of that variable as well. We are aware that we are making a
strong assumption when using the coefficient of variation ￿ i.e. that the standard
deviation of error terms is proportional to the mean of a series.
b) Convergence of bank portfolios and income flows. If there are no frictions and
perfect capital mobility, one should expect to observe no systematic differences in the
composition of bank portfolios and income flows across countries. In a world with
frictions and barriers, it is plausible that banks operating in different market and
regulatory environments should differ across countries. As barriers are lowered, other
things equal, one should expect differences in portfolios and income flows to change, but
not necessarily to diminish, until all barriers and regulatory differences are gone. When
barriers are slowly removed, as in the case of a sudden storm, one should expect water or
funds to flow along a path of least resistance. In the case of banks such channels are
likely to involve interbank flows, both national and international, and off-balance-sheet
positions where regulations are likely to be ineffectively constructed and where
innovations can easily be introduced. The latter are likely to manifest themselves in fees,
commissions, and other flows rather than in net interest income. Such flows have the
effect of reducing international differences in real and nominal rates of return.
Thus, in the period before a new equilibrium is achieved, we expect to find
distinctive increases in interbank flows and in non-interest bank revenues. They may be
as much a consequence of unrelated technical innovations as European unification ￿
again an identification problem!
c) Tests for convergence of marginal rates of return on assets and marginal costs
of liabilities. From the foregoing charts that showed trends in nominal money market and
government bond interest rates, there is a strong suggestion that security interest rates are
converging in Europe. A different and more challenging question is whether marginal
rates of return on assets and marginal costs of liabilities in bank portfolios in different
countries are converging. During the past decade there has been a series of bank mergers,
failures, and crises that have resulted in a sharp reduction in the number of banks and
branches in several countries. During the same period there have also been increases in
numbers of banks and branches in arguably under-banked countries. In this turbulent
setting the prospective introduction of the euro is likely to have significantly reduced
international differences in returns among financial intermediaries. We expect indications
of convergence of marginal rates of return or cost to be stronger in the EMU than in other
groups of countries.
We approach this question using the technique of statistical cost accounting. This
method has been applied previously to samples of Indian, US, and Italian banks with
some success (Cf. Hester [1964], Hester and Pierce [1975], and Calcagnini and Hester
[1997]). Briefly, the method assumes that assets and liabilities have distinctive attributes
and costs and that knowledge of the composition of a bank￿s noncash assets and liabilities
should allow its profits to be predicted. Formally, let y measure a bank￿s net income in a9
year, ai measure the ith noncash asset, and lj measure the jth liability, all divided through
by the bank￿s total assets, ta, where all assets and liabilities are the bank￿s average
holdings over the year. Then the statistical cost accounting model for a bank in year t is:
1) yt   =    γt (1 / tat)    +    ∑ α it  ait    -   ∑ δjt  ljt   +   εt
If the parameter γt is negative, economies of scale are present. The parameters αit
measure the changes in the bank￿s net income that results from replacing one unit of cash
with one unit of the ith asset in year t; thus, they are marginal rates of return. The
parameters δjt similarly measure the changes in the bank￿s net income that results from
adding one unit of cash and one unit of the jth liability in year t; they are marginal costs of
liabilities. It is expected that αs should be positive and δs should be negative. A
maintained hypothesis is that changes in cash assets have no effect on a bank￿s net
income. This is arguable in the case of countries such as Italy where interest is paid on
bank reserves, but defensible in the case of noninterest bearing reserves and till cash.
Interbank deposits and loans are included in noncash assets and liabilities and, therefore,
present no problem when the technique is applied. A bank￿s book net worth can be
ignored because it contains no independent information; it is tautologically the difference
between the reported values of the bank￿s assets and liabilities.
In Section V this model is estimated from samples of banks from nine different
countries for each of five years.
IV    DATA    RESOURCES
The data analyzed in the next section of this paper have been assembled from
several sources and present a number of challenges for studying trends in European
banking and financial markets. Information about inflation and selected interest rates in a
country comes from the International Monetary Fund￿s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) year 2000 compact disk. No attempt has been made to use Euro Area data as
reported in IFS.
Information about real per capita GDP, number of banks, aggregate bank assets,
and bank income comes from files assembled by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The definition of banks that underlies bank
aggregates differs across countries; data are not available in all years for some countries.
Bank data are constructed from a sample of banks that countries use when reporting to
the OECD. Data on the number of branches per capita in the OECD files are not the same
as those reported by the European Central Bank (ECB), perhaps because of different
definitions and samples of banks.
Data on automated teller machines, point of sale terminals, and information about
transactions media and their use come from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Data on the number of branches per capita are not the same as those reported by either
the OECD or the ECB. The BIS only reports information for large countries; data on
some EMU countries are not available from the BIS.10
Data on individual commercial banks that are used in the statistical cost
accounting analysis are from International Bank Credit Analysis, Ltd. (Fitch-IBCA). This
dataset, BankScope, is a collection of bank statements that have been assembled from
reports that banks issued in accordance with reporting requirements established by
different countries. The statements are, therefore, not strictly comparable. We restrict
attention to individual commercial banks, consolidated bank holding companies with
international subsidiaries, and consolidated bank holding companies with domestic
subsidiaries. We avoid double counting by excluding bank holding companies that have
banking units that also appear in the sample as individual commercial banks. In the
empirical work reported in the present paper, we have excluded savings and co-operative
banks, in an attempt to maintain some comparability across countries. Commercial and
other types of banks have different behavioral characteristics. The percentages of banks
in the BankScope dataset that are savings and co-operative banks in different countries
differ from the percentages in the population of banks in the countries. By restricting
attention to commercial banks, we avoid distortions that arise from non-proportional
sampling.
The method used in selecting banks by IBCA seems to be an informal
experimental design ￿ essentially a collection of statements that have been published or
are conveniently accessible. We are using the June 2000 compact disk from IBCA. On
September 25, 2000, the IBCA website stated BankScope contains ￿Up to 8 years of
detailed financial information on the top 6,000 European banks and the top 1,400 North
American banks.￿  The number of banks for which data are available for any country is
substantially less than the number of existing banks. Table 5 summarizes the availability
of data from BankScope. The last two columns report total assets in the BankScope
sample expressed as a percentage of total banking assets as reported by the OECD for
1994 and 1997. The UK share exceeds 100% because some large international banks
have their assets credited to the UK in the BankScope sample. We arbitrarily restrict
attention to European countries in which there were at least 30 commercial banks
available in one of the years 1993 ￿ 98.
3 Data on US banks are included to facilitate
comparisons. The second column indicates the numbers of all types of banks and the
third the number of commercial banks that were available in at least one year of this
period. The next five columns report the number of observations that were available for
the statistical cost accounting analysis in each of the years, 1994 ￿ 98.
For a bank in the BankScope file to be used in our statistical cost accounting
analysis, its balance sheets must be available at both the beginning and end of a calendar
year, must have the property that the sum of its assets equals the sum of its liabilities and
net worth, and must have nonzero reported values for all variables that we study. As
Table 5 suggests, many banks were lost when these rather weak standards were imposed.
Further, because of national differences in accounting practices that are described in
[FØdØration des Experts Compatables EuropØens, 1996], BankScope balance sheet data
can only be studied at very high levels of aggregation. Even such highly aggregated
                                                          
3 In this paper we arbitrarily excluded commercial banks located in Luxembourg because the vast majority
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variables incorporate some small measurement errors, which impair the parameter
estimates reported in the next section. Nevertheless, we believe this is the best available
international source of information on commercial banks and that it yields valid insights
about the process of financial integration in Europe.
We know of several other studies that have used data from BankScope. Two, by
Bikker and Groeneveld [1998] and De Bandt and Davis [1999], report having similar
concerns about data quality when describing their research projects:
￿Apart from common factors, the structure of the banking markets in individual
EU countries also ￿ still ￿ depends on numerous country-specific features, e.g.
national institutions, the degree of government intervention, the sophistication of
the financial system, etc. Moreover, national balance sheet figures are not always
perfectly comparable due to existing differences in national accounting practices
and definitions.￿ (Bikker and Groeneveld, p.15)
￿We focus on the spreadsheet format provided by IBCA which offers annual data
that are reasonably comparable across countries.  .   .   .  It is necessary to stress
that the sample is not exhaustive for any of the countries under review, in
particular because the coverage of banks by IBCA has expanded over time. The
question is therefore in which direction this may bias the results.   .   .   .  Finally,
some of the banks that are recorded by IBCA only report partial information.   .   .
The variables chosen are shown as they appear in the harmonized balance sheets
of banks in the IBCA database. The data hence remains vulnerable to any
differences in accounting conventions. Whereas most of the variables are
straightforwardly defined, it is important to note that total income is defined not to
include capital gains but only commissions in respect of non-interest income.￿
(De Bandt and Davis, pp. 11 ￿ 2)
V     EMPIRICAL    RESULTS
a) Testing for convergence of time series. The Figures discussed in Section II
strongly suggest convergence of selected time series is occurring in the EMU. In this
subsection we formally test whether standard deviations calculated from cross sections of
countries decrease over time
4. Specifically, standard deviations calculated from three
samples of countries are considered for each variable:  i) the set of seventeen countries
that are plotted in Figures 1 and 2, ii) the eleven EMU countries that appear in Figure 1,
and iii) the six non-EMU countries that appear in Figure 2. In the following tests we have
regressed the standard deviations of the variables being examined on time with and
without a correction for possible first-order serial correlation of the error terms and, when
necessary, on another variable. There were few substantive differences in the estimated
time trend when the correction for first-order serial correlation was made; so, we report
only results without the correction.
                                                          
4 We performed both β and σ convergence tests with very similar results. To save space, we report only the
results of σ tests in this paper.12
The first panel in Table 6 reports results about convergence of the coefficient of
variation of real per capita GDP over the period 1960 - 97. Because all economies were
growing over this 38-year period, it was expected and confirmed that heteroskedasticity
was present ￿ i.e., that the cross-sectional standard deviation increased over time. As
noted in Section III, a somewhat arbitrary transformation that corrects for growth is to
divide the standard deviation by the mean of real per capita GDP in each year. As the
table indicates, analysis of the resulting coefficients of variation indicates convergence
because a significant negative trend was found in each of the three samples. Convergence
was weakest for the EMU sample, before the introduction of the euro. Figure 1 suggests
that relatively weak convergence in the EMU area largely reflected the divergent
trajectories of three economies, Finland, Luxembourg, and Portugal.
The second and third panels are about inflation rates over the 21-year period 1978
￿ 98, a period coinciding with the life of the EMS. A regression of the standard deviation
of cross sections of inflation rates on time indicates that a strong negative trend exists for
EMU countries, but not for other countries. Because inflation rates themselves were
trending downward, it is again possible that heteroskedasticity is confounding the picture.
An analysis of the coefficient of variation of inflation rates, comparable to that in the
preceding paragraph, suggests inflation rates were diverging in the case of non-EMU
countries but were essentially unchanged for future EMU countries. In both panels the
process of European unification appears to have a convergent effect on inflation relative
to changes in inflation in the other six countries.
The fourth and fifth panels report results about nominal short-term money market
interest rates, over the same 21-year period. The IMF incompletely reported the money
market rate for Luxembourg, so there are only ten EMU interest rates being studied. The
hypothesis is that European integration should result in a rapid convergence of nominal
interest rates. One distorting event occurred in 1992 when there were speculative assaults
on several European currencies, both in and outside of the future EMU. We have
included a binary variable that takes on a value of one for 1992 and zero for other
observations. When regressing the standard deviation of short rates on the binary variable
and the trend variable, time, the t-ratios for the trend variable were significantly different
from zero at the .05 level and negative for all groups, but considerably more negative for
the EMU countries than for the other countries. The coefficients on the binary variable
were all positive, but not significantly so for the ten EMU countries. As noted in Section
II, it is difficult to determine if the negative trend was a result of the downtrend in mean
money market rates or convergence. Again, in an attempt to separate these two possible
sources of a downtrend, we assumed that the effect of the downtrend in interest rates
could be eliminated by deflating data for a year by the mean interest rate. We regressed
the coefficient of variation on time and the binary variable. As in the preceding
paragraph, the result suggests that European monetary integration was effective in
facilitating convergence, because the coefficient of variation had an insignificantly
negative coefficient on the trend variable for the sample of prospective EMU countries,
but was positive for the non-EMU countries and significant at conventional levels. The
non-EMU countries appear to be experiencing diverging nominal money market rates;
the EMU countries were at the same time weakly converging. The coefficient on the
binary variable was not significant in regressions of the coefficient of variation in any of
the three samples; the mean and the standard deviation of short rates rose proportionately13
in response to the speculative attacks of 1992. Nominal money market rates and inflation
are telling the same story about convergence.
Panels six and seven in the table present results for government bond yields over
the same period. Regressions of both the standard deviation and the coefficient of
variation on time are reported. In all three groups standard deviations have a significantly
negative time trend, but about twice as large in absolute value for the eleven EMU
countries as for the non-EMU countries. The coefficient of variation has a significantly
negative trend for the EMU countries; for the non-EMU countries the trend was positive
and significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test. This set of results strongly argues that
bond interest rates in EMU countries were converging, relative to the other countries.
Panels eight and nine present results for ex post real money market interest rates
over the same years. Real rates were constructed by subtracting rates of inflation of the
GDP deflator from nominal rates studied above. Inspection of Figure 4 indicates that real
interest rates in Portugal were exceptionally volatile between 1978 and 1986. Panel eight
reports results with Portugal included and panel nine reports results with Portugal
excluded from the set of EMU countries. Cross-sectional standard deviations are again
regressed on time. In panel eight, the standard deviation has a significant negative trend
for EMU countries, but not for non-EMU countries. In panel nine, which excludes
Portugal, the same result obtains, although obviously the absolute value of the trend is
smaller than in panel 8.
b) Convergence of bank portfolios and income flows. In this subsection, we
attempt to analyze trends in interbank positions and off-balance sheet activities using
information that has been reported by the OECD. From Table 3a, it is clear that trends in
interbank assets and liabilities are very heterogeneous across the seventeen countries.
There is no general trend evident for interbank positions across the countries, but there
are some large changes for individual countries. In some cases, such as Italy, the change
between 1989 and 1993 is the result of a restructuring of the way accounts are assembled.
In large countries outside the EMU, such as Japan, the UK, and the US, the fractions of
total assets held as interbank assets and liabilities are small relative to the average for
countries in the EMU. The role of such cross holdings of funds in the EMU is unclear and
deserves further inquiry.
Figure 6 reports plots of ratios of aggregate non-interest income to aggregate
gross operating income and total assets for EMU countries and for seven non-EMU
countries. Time series of non-interest income are not long enough for Ireland and the
Netherlands to allow meaningful plots of these series. As the foregoing quotation from an
ECB paper suggested, there is a positive trend in the ratios. Table 7a reports results of
regressions of the ratio of non-interest income to gross income on time. Nine of sixteen
(and six of nine EMU) country ratios of non-interest income to gross operating income
have positive time trends that are significant at the .05 level; only Japan has a negative
trend that is statistically significant. In Table 7b, five of sixteen (four of nine EMU)
countries have trends in the ratio of non-interest income to total assets that are
significantly positive. Three (two EMU) countries had significant negative trends.
Because these OECD measures of income include realized capital gains and interest rates
were falling, we initially viewed this result as only weakly supporting the hypothesis
suggested by the ECB paper that EMU banks are rapidly increasing off balance sheet14
activities. However, an unreported comparison of the ranking of either of these trends
with the ranking of changes in money market interest rates between 1985 and 1998
suggests that there is no close relation. The charts in Figure 6 tend to support the ECB
paper hypothesis in the most recent years. All EMU countries had increases in both ratios
between 1994 and 1997. We further note that both ratios were rising rapidly in the US
and that interest rates were not falling much there. We conclude that EMU banks
probably have been significantly increasing off balance sheet activities, especially in the
most recent years.
c) Testing for convergence of marginal rates of return on assets and costs of
liabilities. In this subsection we report results of a statistical cost accounting analysis of
banks in six EMU countries, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain,
and Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the years 1994 ￿ 1998. The
goal in this exercise is to determine whether marginal rates of return on assets and costs
of liabilities at commercial banks are converging in three different populations, the subset
of EMU countries, ￿Europe￿ consisting of the eight European countries, and the eight
European countries and the United States. The dependent variable is net income before
taxes (divided by a bank￿s total assets), which is subject to a number of adjustments; a
better measure would have been net current operating income, but it is not available in
BankScope. Asset and liability variables are deflated by a bank￿s total assets.
Tables 8 and 9 report results from estimating parameters of equation 1) for the
nine countries and the three groups of countries for 1994 and 1998 respectively. In Table
8, with the exception of the United States, all coefficients for financial assets and
liabilities have the expected signs and frequently are different from zero, using a 5% level
of significance in a two-tailed test. These coefficients have the dimension of percent per
year and can be interpreted respectively as marginal rates of return and marginal costs. If
there were no frictions, the marginal rates and costs should be equal for a given asset in
all countries. In 1994 a restrictive monetary policy in the US led to a doubling of short-
term interest rates. The statistical cost accounting model is based on the assumption that
interest rates in a country are constant over an interval of estimation. The US result
suggests that banks with relatively more liabilities and fewer assets were more profitable
when interest rates rose in 1994. An interpretation is that banks with such a portfolio
composition also had a positive gap. Coefficients on fixed assets vary widely and have
different signs. The composition of fixed assets varies widely across countries; they
surely are not valued at market. We offer no interpretation for these coefficients. With the
exception of the Netherlands, the coefficients on the reciprocal of total assets are not
different from zero and thus provide no support for a hypothesis that there are economies
of scale. In six of the nine countries, the F-tests imply that a hypothesis of no relation
between portfolio composition and net income cannot be rejected. The statistical cost
accounting model receives only modest support from the 1994 data.
In contrast, results for 1998 support the statistical cost accounting approach
strongly. Only the regression for Germany has an F value consistent with not rejecting
the null hypothesis. In all twelve regressions, coefficients on assets have positive signs
and coefficients on liabilities have negative signs. In most cases estimated parameters are
significantly different from zero. An interpretation of the change between 1994 and 1998
is that European unification has increasingly compelled banks to compete and to allocate15
bank funds more efficiently at the margin. Again, there is little evidence of economies of
scale, although the coefficient on the reciprocal is significant in the case of France.
Table 10 reports time series of mean reported net income expressed as a
percentage of total assets and the estimated parameters for each of the financial asset and
liability variables for the years 1994 ￿ 98. As in the preceding two tables, estimated
parameters have the expected signs in the vast majority of cases, although their values are
noisy.
5  Income before tax tends to be highest in the three non-EMU countries, Denmark,
the UK, and the US; it is rising in the EMU countries.
To test whether parameter differences in Table 10 are statistically significant, we
employ analysis of covariance. Table 11 reports F-test results of three hypotheses for
each of the five years: i) There are no differences in regressions estimated for all nine
countries, ii) There are no differences in regressions estimated for the eight European
countries, and iii) There are no differences in regressions estimated for the six EMU
countries.
The first row in Table 11 indicates that there is no evidence of convergence in
regression estimates of rates of return and cost and scale economies over the set of nine
countries. The second row, reporting degrees of freedom, shows that the number of banks
in BankScope increased about 20% over the five years. Confining attention to Europe,
the third row indicates that the F values from the analysis of covariance decreased
monotonically over time. However, the null hypothesis that marginal rates of return and
cost are identical across countries is rejected in every year. The fifth row reports F values
for the six EMU countries. The null hypothesis is rejected in the first three years, with
steadily decreasing F values, but cannot be rejected in 1997 or 1998.
6 Thus, one can
conclude that European integration has caused bank marginal rates of return and cost to
converge to the point where they are no longer significantly different by 1997 in the
EMU. A similar conclusion cannot be made for the larger groups of countries. The only
caveat is that the number of banks in the BankScope EMU sample grew by about one-
third during this five-year period, as shown in the sixth row. It might have been a cleaner
test of convergence if the same group of banks had been studied, but that would have
required a large decrease in the number of banks in each country￿s sample in every year.
VI   SUMMARY
Europe and especially the countries in the EMU are in the process of removing
artificial barriers to the flows of goods, people, and funds across borders. This is very
much a work in progress. The equilibrium toward which the economies of Europe are
moving is not well defined. There is no strong argument for believing that economic
measures in a set of countries should move monotonically to their equilibrium values. As
explained in Section II, there are many forces impelling Europe toward a new
equilibrium. These include the removal of barriers and the consequent movement of
                                                          
5  Detailed tables for 1995 ￿ 97, analogous to those for 1994 and 1998, are available from the authors.
6 As implied in footnote 3, the same result obtains when the sample is expanded to seven countries by
adding Luxembourg.16
factors of production, explicit and market-driven harmonization of regulation and
supervisory standards, privatization of state sponsored enterprises, and fiscal
redistribution of resources by the European Union.
The present paper reports results from three different tests of convergence. First,
we employ σ tests that examine whether standard deviations of selected measures
decrease over time as European consolidation proceeds. As explained in Section III,
because some series we study are likely to have heteroskedastic error terms for reasons
that are quite unrelated to European consolidation, we have somewhat arbitrarily also
examined trends in coefficients of variation of a series. We found that five of the original
EC countries and Austria did seem to have relative convergence in real per capita
income, as seen in Figure 1, but in panel 1 of Table 6 the trend in the coefficient of
variation among then prospective EMU countries was smaller in absolute value than was
the corresponding trend for other countries being considered. The other countries
included the world￿s two largest economies, the US and Japan, and other major EU
countries that are not in the EMU. Convergence in real per capita GDP is not
conspicuously more evident among countries in the EMU, at least until 1997.
There is evidence of convergence in inflation rates, real and nominal money
market rates, and in government bond rates. Convergence is strongly suggested in Figures
3 ￿ 5 and in panels 2 ￿ 9 of Table 6. In panels that report estimated trends in standard
deviations, trends for all groups of countries are negative and always largest in absolute
value and significant at the .05 level for EMU countries. In panels that report estimated
trends in coefficients of variation, trends for EMU countries were always negative and
smaller than those for other groups of countries. We interpret these results as supporting
the general thesis that European unification has led to convergence in financial markets,
even though there remain differences in institutions and practices across countries. As
argued in the introduction, convergence should be first seen in financial markets, because
funds flow across borders more easily than labor or other factors of production.
Second, we study whether there are distinctive differences and changes in bank
portfolios and earnings that might be expected to accompany financial integration in the
context of continuing regulatory distortions. Banks can avoid regulations by shifting
accounts and activities to other countries and off balance sheets where regulations are
less stringent and enforcement is weaker. These tests are seriously compromised by the
ongoing rapid technological change in finance, which is evident in Tables 2 and 4c,
because such change also affects these variables. Changes in payments technology are
remarkably heterogeneous across countries, both in the EMU and elsewhere. Interbank
deposits were expected to be high and rising as banks struggled to compete in markets
with heterogeneous regulations. In Table 3 it can be seen that interbank deposits vary
enormously across countries as a fraction of total assets; they tend to be high in EMU
countries but there is no general trend.
Trends in the ratio of non-interest income to gross income and to total assets are
reported in Figure 6 and Table 7. They also convey a mixed picture. The trend is
generally positive in both series, but this could be an artifact of the fact that interest rates
have been falling, because non-interest income includes realized capital gains in the
OECD accounts. As we report in the preceding section, there is no close relation between17
changes in interest rates and the trends in Table 7. A clear majority of the EMU country
trends are positive, which suggests that income from fees and other off balance sheet
sources were rising relative to total bank income and assets. Both sets of the non-EMU
country trends were about equally divided between being positive and negative. We are
inclined to accept the interpretation that growing non-interest income reflects both an
equilibrating adjustment to continuing regulatory barriers, new financial services, and
technical progress in intermediation.
Third, the analysis of BankScope data provides further evidence of convergence
in financial markets of EMU countries over the years 1994 - 98. Using statistical cost
accounting, we report evidence of convergence of marginal rates of return on assets and
cost of liabilities in Tables 8 ￿ 11. The complete results of the analysis for 1994 and 1998
are reported in Tables 8 and 9. The method yielded mostly plausible results in both years,
but was much more successful in 1998. An interpretation is that variations in assets and
liabilities across banks were more closely related to variations in bank net income then,
because banks were forced increasingly to compete for assets and liabilities in markets
with well-established shadow prices. Table 10 reports parameter estimates obtained for
banks in nine countries and three larger regions in each of the years 1994 ￿ 98, and mean
rates of return on total assets. The estimates are noisy, in part because of small and
changing samples, heterogeneous national accounting methods, and fluctuations in
national money market rates. Table 11 reports results of analyses of covariance for the
three larger regions. The resulting F ratios imply that there were significant variations in
the estimated rates of return and cost for all nine countries (eight European countries and
the US) and for the eight European countries, when they were aggregated into a region.
In other words, a hypothesis of convergence to a single set of market prices was rejected.
However, when attention was confined to countries in the EMU area, an
analogous hypothesis of convergence could be rejected in each of the years 1994, 1995,
1996, but not in 1997 and 1998. The obvious conclusion is that European unification has
proceeded to the point in 1997 and 1998 that one can no longer reject the hypothesis that
there is a single market for banks in the EMU. While differences undoubtedly exist
across local markets, there appears to be movement towards equality in marginal rates of
return across countries. Efficiency gains from having a single set of shadow prices
(marginal rates of return and cost) in banking markets should result in improved
allocations of resources in the years to come.
Madison, Wisconsin October 10, 2000
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Table 1 - Gross Domestic Product Deflators (1995=100)
(Annual % Growth Rates for the Calendar Years Showna)
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1992 1994 1996 1998
Austria 6.02 7.66 7.89 8.61 3.58 6.56 3.66 3.08 2.11 2.74 4.33 2.85 1.28 0.63
Belgium 5.55 7.32 12.34 7.52 4.50 5.68 5.65 7.73 1.43 4.91 3.62 1.83 1.16 1.58
Denmark 7.94 10.76 13.84 9.86 7.90 11.78 8.38 4.92 5.13 5.23 2.89 1.72 2.48 2.07
Finland 7.61 14.11 13.27 9.93 8.78 10.46 8.57 6.39 4.68 6.53 0.86 2.00 -0.23 2.87
France 6.34 8.47 12.97 9.25 10.11 11.39 9.73 5.76 2.95 3.26 1.99 1.79 1.47 0.74
Germany 7.74 6.36 5.66 3.73 3.80 4.24 3.26 2.05 1.88 2.41 5.04 2.51 1.03 1.03
Greece 3.15 19.43 12.32 12.92 18.63 19.74 19.12 17.67 14.26 14.77 15.12 11.84 7.38 4.91
Ireland 10.53 14.78 23.87 13.26 13.67 17.44 11.73 5.27 2.20 5.44 2.77 1.71 2.28 5.64
Italy 6.64 13.77 15.95 19.16 15.65 19.13 14.47 9.01 6.12 6.46 4.55 3.48 5.17 2.83
Luxembourgb -0.81 12.20 -0.86 1.17 6.35 7.18 6.82 2.98 0.93 3.47 4.28 5.34 0.03 n.a.
Netherlands 8.49 8.84 9.81 6.02 6.54 6.42 1.46 2.91 -0.72 1.22 2.38 1.84 0.32 2.91
Norway 6.67 9.17 10.04 8.32 5.52 12.86 6.99 5.21 6.93 5.71 -0.43 -0.16 4.70 -0.52
Portugal 5.07 7.99 16.22 26.39 19.69 17.61 24.60 21.73 10.13 12.13 10.62 6.07 3.08 4.13
Spain 7.83 11.84 16.78 23.38 16.93 12.57 11.77 7.71 5.85 7.01 6.87 3.99 3.18 2.23
Sweden 7.29 7.12 14.91 10.96 7.48 9.55 10.03 6.73 5.07 8.03 1.05 6.82 1.42 1.26
United Kingdom 8.95 6.85 26.64 13.48 15.18 11.94 5.94 5.74 5.73 7.89 3.51 1.08 3.05 2.47
Western Europec 6.56 10.42 13.23 11.50 10.27 11.53 9.51 7.18 4.67 6.08 4.34 3.42 2.36 2.32
EMU Countries 6.46 10.30 12.17 11.67 9.96 10.79 9.25 6.78 3.41 5.05 4.30 3.04 1.71 2.46
United States 5.04 5.60 9.33 6.44 8.33 9.33 3.96 3.16 3.00 3.81 2.43 2.08 1.94 1.17
Japan 5.57 12.87 7.69 5.84 3.04 3.69 1.39 1.55 0.15 2.14 1.73 0.17 -1.44 0.70
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Compact Disk, August 2000.
a)  Years 1990 and 1991 were excluded since figures from Germany before and after the reunification are not comparable
b)  Data for Luxembourg are from OECD (1990=100)
c)  Mean of national inflation rates; Switzerland is not included.20











1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998
Belgium 279 562 5251 9124 836 1178 11 16 13.786 8.520
Canada 556 774 2142 12960 476 1829 38 53 73.000 55.592
France 325 490 9185 9949 372 514 13 21 85.076 81.932
Germany 308 556 345 2816 552 1114 12a 17 11.501 8.001
Italy 268 482 1360 5977 287 471 4 8 10.947 11.554
Japan 936 1127 168 127 1769 2030 3 6 2.628 2.056
Netherlands 291 419 1600 8569 82 261 20 27 14.274 2.968
Sweden 256 281 3064 8405 1313 776 28 38 8.398 .339
Switzerland 439 722 1433 7167 716 1060 7 11 2.210 1.081
United Kingdom 328 416 4639 10304 888 1421 21 31 49.591 42.399
United States 367 692 600 6289 2059 2767 30 41 233.528 247.873
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 1998, 2000.
a. 199421
Table 3 ￿ Aggregate Bank Portfolios





























1987 1.9 35.7 45.7 11.4 5.4 3.5 0.1 36.7 40.2 15.1 4.5 0.654 1252
1989 2.0 31.9 49.2 11.6 5.2 4.3 0.0 33.6 41.0 17.2 3.9 0.716 1240
1993 1.8 29.8 51.1 11.2 6.1 5.0 0.0 29.4 44.4 16.9 4.3 0.485 1063
AT (1)
1997 1.5 28.1 51.2 16.1 3.1 4.5 0.0 30.1 42.0 17.8 5.5 0.428 995
1985 0.2 32.5 33.5 29.4 4.3 2.5 0.0 46.2 29.7 16.5 5.0 0.200 120
1989 0.2 31.7 34.2 29.1 4.7 3.4 0.0 43.7 33.9 13.2 5.9 0.129 120
1993 0.2 32.5 33.4 28.5 5.4 2.5 0.0 39.7 33.0 18.0 6.8 0.258 150
BE (1)
1997 0.2 32.0 31.8 30.3 5.7 2.6 0.0 40.8 35.3 13.2 8.0 0.251 131
1985 5.0 16.1 35.2 27.5 16.2 8.7 3.0 23.2 48.2 0.0 16.9 3.720 217
1989 1.6 16.2 43.1 21.7 17.4 8.7 1.9 25.6 46.8 0.0 17.0 0.276 199
1993 3.6 24.2 45.9 22.3 4.0 5.5 8.0 23.9 53.6 2.2 6.7 0.646 112
DK (2)
1997 5.5 17.8 44.7 27.4 4.6 6.5 2.5 26.5 52.0 4.0 8.4 1.054 92
1985 4.6 4.3 63.9 9.6 17.5 6.4 2.3 3.7 64.4 2.3 20.9 0.389 635
1989 4.7 3.6 65.2 13.1 13.5 6.7 0.6 2.6 50.8 6.5 32.7 0.289 553
1993 1.8 6.8 53.0 20.6 17.9 5.0 0.8 2.3 49.3 8.6 34.0 -1.421 358
FI (1)
1997 2.1 3.5 54.7 22.0 17.6 5.5 0.4 3.7 56.5 5.7 28.2 0.860 348
1988 1.4 42.2 39.5 7.6 9.3 2.9 1.5 45.1 23.7 16.6 10.1 0.481 2050
1989 1.2 41.4 39.9 7.8 9.8 3.1 1.4 44.7 23.1 17.3 10.4 0.414 2021
1993 0.2 39.5 40.1 14.6 5.6 4.5 0.2 38.8 25.6 24.0 7.0 0.122 1635
FR (1)
1997 0.3 37.3 36.0 19.8 6.6 4.0 0.2 38.8 29.8 17.2 10.0 0.278 1288
1985 2.7 20.8 58.5 15.3 2.8 3.6 3.3 21.8 54.0 13.7 3.6 0.716 4439
1989 2.5 24.5 55.1 15.3 2.6 3.8 4.4 22.9 52.8 12.5 3.6 0.498 4089
1993 1.7 22.1 54.8 18.8 2.5 4.0 4.2 22.9 51.1 13.2 4.6 0.584 3769
GE (1)
1997 1.1 22.6 52.2 21.5 2.7 4.1 2.5 27.9 45.1 14.8 5.6 0.468 3284
1989 18.0 5.4 31.3 36.7 8.6 3.1 0.4 1.9 82.2 0.0 12.4 0.457 15
1993 17.6 7.8 23.8 36.5 14.3 4.6 0.2 2.8 78.5 0.9 13.1 1.057 20 GR (3)
1997 17.7 13.5 31.9 32.6 4.3 5.1 2.9 7.0 78.8 0.4 5.8 0.994 19
1995 7.8 9.2 36.8 21.6 24.6 3.9 0.8 10.3 45.2 8.9 30.9 1.500 44 IE (1)
1997 7.4 7.4 42.3 14.2 28.6 5.4 0.4 8.5 43.0 8.2 34.5 1.347 52
(*) Percentage of total assets. Source: Bank Profitability (OECD)
(1) All banks
(2) Commercial banks and savings banks
(3) Commercial banks22
Table 3 (continued)





























1985 4.5 7.1 42.6 14.5 31.3 6.4 0.1 7.4 38.1 8.0 39.9 0.967 422
1989 3.1 6.6 41.2 12.2 36.9 6.2 0.1 7.1 31.3 13.4 41.8 0.948 391
1993 0.6 18.7 55.1 18.7 6.9 6.7 0.0 22.6 56.2 7.6 6.9 0.809 335
IT (1)
1997 0.4 17.8 55.3 19.3 7.1 5.7 0.0 26.6 48.7 11.5 7.5 0.328 255
1985 0.0 15.2 55.8 12.2 16.8 2.3 0.7 0.0 75.8 0.8 20.3 0.458 77
1989 0.0 16.1 53.7 13.3 16.9 3.0 0.4 0.0 76.1 0.8 19.7 0.463 145
1993 0.0 10.7 65.3 13.8 10.3 3.7 0.6 0.0 77.5 0.8 17.4 0.185 140
JP (3)
1997 0.0 5.9 65.5 14.3 14.2 2.8 0.7 0.0 75.0 0.9 20.6 -0.498 136
1985 0.2 54.5 32.0 6.8 6.5 3.5 0.0 66.7 23.0 1.5 5.4 0.334 118
1989 0.2 60.2 23.9 7.3 8.4 3.5 0.0 50.0 38.5 3.2 4.8 0.310 166
1993 0.9 58.4 22.3 14.8 3.6 2.6 0.0 43.9 44.2 4.3 5.0 0.519 218
LU (3)
1997 0.2 54.4 18.7 22.5 4.1 2.3 0.0 46.6 37.6 8.3 5.2 0.533 215
1993 2.7 20.6 62.8 11.6 2.4 4.1 0.3 24.1 45.4 13.6 12.5 0.679 175 NL (1)
1997 1.8 14.4 62.4 19.0 2.4 4.3 0.7 25.0 40.6 15.0 14.5 0.732 169
1985 5.7 14.6 53.6 7.9 18.1 5.6 1.0 1.6 77.1 0.8 13.9 0.331 24
1989 12.8 12.1 37.4 15.0 22.7 10.3 0.3 4.9 73.2 0.9 10.4 1.024 29
1993 8.7 18.9 35.8 22.9 13.7 9.5 1.0 19.7 54.9 1.5 13.5 0.982 35
PT (3)
1997 4.0 27.4 33.8 19.1 15.6 8.1 0.3 28.7 46.3 1.8 14.8 0.779 44
1985 9.1 12.8 41.9 21.6 14.7 7.9 2.4 13.7 61.8 3.3 10.9 0.839 364
1989 9.3 13.1 44.2 22.3 11.1 8.8 3.3 10.7 63.4 1.7 12.0 1.405 333
1993 4.2 18.8 41.7 17.0 18.3 8.9 6.3 16.4 54.5 1.7 12.2 0.362 316
ES (1)
1997 2.3 17.2 47.3 18.3 14.8 8.6 1.7 17.4 55.3 3.3 13.8 0.941 307
1985 1.9 20.8 59.5 6.7 11.0 4.5 0.0 n.a. 89.1 3.5 2.9 1.090 54
1989 1.5 16.1 62.2 6.9 13.3 5.0 0.0 n.a. 87.2 3.4 4.3 0.183 49
1993 0.8 14.9 54.5 16.0 13.8 3.8 0.0 n.a. 71.6 10.9 13.7 0.755 37
UK (3)
1997 0.5 12.6 53.0 19.9 14.0 4.1 0.0 12.5 52.6 13.7 17.0 1.152 44
1985 5.7 6.7 63.8 17.6 6.2 6.2 0.0 2.5 75.0 0.5 15.8 0.911 14393
1989 5.3 5.3 65.2 18.2 6.0 6.2 0.0 1.6 75.5 0.6 16.1 0.765 12728
1993 4.2 3.2 60.7 25.8 6.2 8.0 0.0 1.2 72.9 1.0 16.8 1.760 11001
US (3)
1997 3.9 3.2 63.3 20.2 9.3 8.3 0.0 1.0 67.3 1.2 22.1 1.926 9187
(*) Percentage of total assets. Source: Bank Profitability (OECD)
(1) All banks
(2) Commercial banks and savings banks
(3) Commercial banks23
Table 4a - Capacity indicator 1: Number of credit institutions
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997
FR n. a. 2,105 2,027 1,469 1,407 1,299
AT 1,595 1,241 1,210 1,041 1,019 995
IT 1,156 1,192 1,156 970 937 935
UK n. a. n. a. n. a. 564 550 551
ES n. a. 695 696 506 458 416
FI 669 654 529 381 373 371
SE n. a. 779 704 249 237 242
PT 35 224 260 233 228 235
LU 111 118 177 220 221 215
BE 176 165 157 145 141 134
DK 197 166 124 122 125 100
NL n. a. 81 111 102 101 90
IE 61 58 48 56 62 70
GR 34 38 39 53 55 54
GE 5,356 4,740 4,720 3,785 3,675 3,578
EU n. a. 12,256 11,958 9,896 9,589 9,285
Table 4b - Capacity indicator 2: Number of branches per 1,000 capita
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997
ES 0.62 0.76 0.83 0.93 0.95 0.97
LU 0.65 0.68 0.78 0.85 0.81 0.75
BE n. a. 0.87 0.90 0.76 0.74 0.72
AT 0.45 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
GE n. a. 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.57
FR 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.44
IT 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.41 0.43 0.44
NL 0.67 0.59 0.54 0.44 0.44 0.44
DK 0.71 0.72 0.58 0.42 0.42 0.42
PT 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.35 0.38 0.41
FI 0.80 0.89 0.58 0.38 0.34 0.32
IE n. a. 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.32
UK n. a. 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.32
SE n. a. 0.42 0.38 0.30 0.28 0.29
GR n. a. 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.24
EU ave. (unweigh.) n. a. 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.48
Table 4c - Capacity indicator 3: Number of ATMs per 1,000 capita
1985 1990 1995 1996 1997
ES 0.46 0.66 0.76 0.88 n. a.
LU n. a. n. a. 0.45 0.53 n. a.
AT 0.04 0.20 0.42 0.48 0.53
PT 0.01 0.06 0.36 0.45 0.52
GE n. a. 0.18 0.44 0.46 0.50
BE 0.06 0.08 0.35 0.41 0.49
FI 0.14 0.57 0.47 0.45 0.45
IT n. a. 0.17 0.38 0.42 0.44
FR 0.16 0.26 0.39 0.42 n. a.
NL n. a. 0.18 0.36 0.37 0.38
UK 0.18 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.38
IE 0.07 0.14 0.26 0.28 0.33
SE 0.15 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27
DK n. a. 0.04 0.21 0.24 n. a.
GR n. a. 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.15
EU ave. (unweigh.) 0.10 0.20 0.36 0.40 0.44
Source: ECB (1999).24
Table 5 ￿ Number and Share of BankScope Banks in Sample
Country All banks Commercial
Banks
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 BankScope sample total
assets/OECD total assets
(Statistical Cost Accounting Studies ) 1994 1997
Austria 122 37 14 20 30 33 34 27.8% 37.9%
Denmark 89 54 38 44 50 50 51 80.2% 91.7%
France
7 329 211 162 174 172 175 178 51.0% 57.5%
Germany 1674 202 138 151 157 163 163 11.4% 48.1%
Italy 516 86 54 61 65 73 79 54.8% 68.2%
Netherlands 44 38 26 26 28 29 30 69.2% 67.8%
Spain 143 80 19 20 22 54 59 63.8% 70.3%
United Kingdom 126 122 66 67 76 84 85 120.8% 124.3%
United States 634 361 330 335 344 343 343 47.8% 67.4%
                                                          
7 One French bank, Banque d￿Arbitrage et de Credit, was dropped because it reported a ratio of profits to
total assets that exceeded 10000%, which severely distorted results. No other banks were dropped, although
some accounting anomalies were evident, as explained in the text. An example of an anomaly that did not
disqualify a bank is that occasionally banks reported having negative gross operating expenses!25
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** 0.403 0.250 12.807 **
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0.665 0.503 17.851 **
Panel 5







































** 0.732 0.6033 51.854 **




** 0.451 0.5509 15.625 **
Panel 7










** 0.574 0.0497 25.629**

















** 0.307 1.4815 8.432**






Real (ex-post) Money Market Rate (SD):










* 0.258 0.6882 6.594*
** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 5% level.
CV= Coefficient of variation; SD= Standard Deviation.27
Table 7a ￿ Regressions of Ratios of Non-interest Income to Gross Income on Time
Constant Trend R-squared Standard
error
F-statistic






































































* 0.329 7.4101 5.396*




* 0.446 2.4007 8.845*




** 0.899 1.1169 98.323 **
** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 5% level.28
Table 7b ￿ Regressions of Ratios of Non-interest Income to Total Assets on Time
Constant Trend R-squared Standard
error
F-statistic
















































































** 0.889 11.6523 88.196 **
** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 5% level.
a)  data for 1990 and 1992 are missing. We have interpolated from adjacent years and used these imputed
values in the reported regression for Portugal.29
Table 8 ￿ Statistical Cost Accounting Regression Results for 1994a


























































*4 . 4 9
(0.83)
**
Other earning assets 54.83
(19.02)



























R2 0.825 0.070 0.070 0.183 0.639 0.636 0.058
Standard error 2.00 1.55 1.11 1.03 0.65 0.93 1.44
Mean 1.55 0.58 0.83 0.45 0.76 0.85 0.70
No. of observations 14 162 138 54 26 19 413







































































R2 0.157 0.219 0.157 0.072 0.085
Standard error 1.11 1.94 1.33 1.56 1.51
Mean 0.51 1.59 1.88 1.22 0.80
No. of observations 38 66 330 847 517
F 0.99 2.80 * 10.02 ** 10.83 ** 7.94 **
a)  All variables are in millions of dollars.
** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 5% level.30
Table 9 ￿ Statistical Cost Accounting Regression Results for 1998a




























































































R2 0.384 0.095 0.030 0.276 0.398 0.235 0.050
Standard error 0.69 4.14 2.67 2.17 2.15 1.40 3.05
Mean 0.66 1.12 1.24 1.36 1.58 1.37 1.21
No.  observations 34 178 163 79 30 59 543







































































R2 0.406 0.255 0.119 0.044 0.058
Standard error 1.02 5.01 1.72 2.96 3.35
Mean 1.71 1.73 2.15 1.60 1.31
No. of  observations 51 85 343 1022 679
F 5.13 ** 4.50 ** 7.59 ** 7.74 ** 6.89 **
a)  All variables are in millions of dollars.
** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 5% level..31
Table 10a - Net Income Before Tax over Total Assets
(% per year)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria 1.55 0.67 0.75 0.65 0.66
Denmark 0.51 2.21 1.87 1.60 1.71
France 0.58 0.55 0.28 0.65 1.12
Germany 0.83 0.88 0.84 0.83 1.24
Italy 0.45 1.06 1.01 0.82 1.36
Netherlands 0.76 0.97 1.31 1.35 1.58
Spain 0.85 1.10 1.00 0.82 1.37
United Kingdom 1.59 1.74 1.80 1.77 1.73
United States 1.88 1.92 2.00 2.14 2.15
Total Countries 1.22 1.35 1.32 1.37 1.60
European Countries 0.80 1.01 0.93 0.97 1.31
EMU Countries 0.70 0.78 0.69 0.79 1.21
Table 10b ￿ Estimated Marginal Cost of Deposits
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria -54.49 -17.12 -0.26 -0.80 -1.37
Denmark -2.50 -7.08 -8.41 -17.95 -17.27
France -4.29 -2.76 -2.44 -1.52 -10.23
Germany -1.70 -1.68 -2.47 -1.67 -1.68
Italy -7.43 -12.78 -7.84 -0.56 -13.48
Netherlands -17.84 -17.71 -10.02 -9.81 -12.39
Spain -0.14 0.12 -1.51 -1.78 -5.29
United Kingdom -3.48 -3.74 -3.52 -5.22 -5.83
United States 2.08 -0.50 -0.30 -2.12 -6.64
Total Countries -2.50 -2.76 -2.73 -2.62 -5.69
European Countries -3.81 -3.54 -3.73 -3.59 -6.11
EMU Countries -3.61 -2.79 -3.17 -1.93 -6.2032
Table 10c ￿ Estimated Marginal Cost of Other Liabilities
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria -53.23 -15.84 0.47 -1.54 -3.04
Denmark -3.91 -10.30 -10.26 -17.66 -15.46
France -4.38 -2.89 -2.49 -1.82 -11.48
Germany -1.66 -1.44 -2.18 -1.63 -1.53
Italy -8.88 -12.49 -8.70 0.21 -12.56
Netherlands -18.31 -17.78 -9.82 -10.04 -13.40
Spain -5.06 -3.10 -3.01 -2.15 -5.39
United Kingdom -3.61 -3.73 -3.83 -4.65 -10.69
United States 3.33 0.05 0.07 -0.24 -2.83
Total Countries -3.35 -3.85 -4.05 -3.63 -6.73
European Countries -3.89 -4.08 -4.40 -3.87 -7.08
EMU Countries -3.81 -3.04 -3.56 -2.20 -6.79
Table 10d ￿Estimated Marginal Rate of Return for Loans
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria 54.83 15.28 0.89 2.12 2.82
Denmark 3.08 8.75 10.45 18.72 18.55
France 4.91 3.73 2.69 2.26 11.37
Germany 2.95 2.92 3.22 2.59 2.70
Italy 8.43 12.92 9.27 -0.07 11.97
Netherlands 18.67 18.12 9.24 9.41 12.77
Spain 5.02 5.12 5.04 4.14 6.74
United Kingdom 5.11 5.48 5.37 6.26 9.85
United States 1.11 3.47 3.17 4.14 8.33
Total Countries 4.80 5.20 5.11 4.82 7.97
European Countries 4.64 4.94 4.99 4.60 7.69
EMU Countries 4.49 4.02 4.00 2.78 7.22
Table 10e ￿ Estimated Marginal Rate of Return for Other Earning Assets
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria 54.83 15.26 0.82 1.79 3.18
Denmark 3.60 10.03 9.99 18.30 16.52
France 4.86 3.27 3.12 2.76 12.71
Germany 1.90 1.71 2.53 2.03 2.31
Italy 8.41 13.16 9.44 1.25 16.04
Netherlands 18.45 17.92 10.38 10.27 13.39
Spain 0.86 0.76 2.64 2.45 5.57
United Kingdom 3.75 3.60 3.44 4.69 5.26
United States -1.71 1.12 1.39 2.87 6.76
Total Countries 3.24 3.58 3.81 3.60 6.78
European Countries 4.21 4.09 4.52 4.24 7.23
EMU Countries 4.12 3.28 3.93 2.80 7.6333
Table 11 ￿ Analysis of Covariance of Estimated Regressions
(F-tests)
 Null hypothesis 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
No differences
   among  countries
6.247 ** 5.348 ** 4.684 ** 5.005 ** 3.268 **
Degrees of freedom (48/799) (48/849) (48/896) (48/956) (48/974)
No European
   differences
3.312 ** 3.071 ** 2.575 ** 2.528 ** 1.905 **
Degrees of freedom (42/475) (42/520) (42/552) (42/619) (42/637)
No EMU
   differences
3.996 ** 1.929 ** 1.741 ** 1.200 1.255
Degrees of freedom (30/377) (30/415) (30/438) (30/491) (30/507)
      ** significant at the 1% level34


































































































































































AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY IRELAND
ITALY LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN










1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
EMU (11 countries) DENMARK GREECE NORWAY
SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES JAPAN35







1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY
IRELAND ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN











1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY
IRELAND ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN36







1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FRANCE GERMANY IRELAND
ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN37









1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria Belgium Finland France
Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherland
Portugal Spain







1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria Belgium Finland France
Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherland
Portugal Spain38













1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Denmark Greece Japan Norway
Sweden United Kingdom United States








1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Denmark Greece Japan Norway
Sweden United Kingdom United States